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This study attempts to identify factors responsible for differences in the productivity of 
cattle managed by private and communal livestock farmers in the southern region of 
Botswana during 1999/2000. Sample survey data are used to estimate the parameters 
of a block recursive regression model. Some of the equations postulated in the model 
are estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS) to account for likely correlation 
between endogenous explanatory variables and the error term. The results show that 
(a) respondents with secure land tenure (private farms) and larger herds use more 
agricultural credit than do those who rely on open access communal grazing to raise 
cattle; (b) secure tenure and higher levels of liquidity from long-term credit and off-
farm wage remittances promote investment in fixed improvements to land; (c) 
liquidity from short-term credit and wage remittances supports expenditure on 
operating inputs; and (d) herd productivity increases with greater investment in 
operating inputs and fixed improvements, and is therefore positively (but indirectly) 
influenced by secure land tenure.  
 
It can be inferred that government should (a) uphold private property rights to land 
where they already exist; (b) privatise open access grazing to individual owner-
operators where this is politically, socially and economically feasible; and (c) where 
privatisation to individuals is not feasible, government should encourage users to 
convert the grazing into common property by subsidising the transaction costs of 
defining user groups and the boundaries of their resources, and of negotiating and 
enforcing rules limiting individual use of common property. This first-step in a 
gradual shift towards private property might be followed by a conversion of user-
groups into non-user groups organised along the lines of investor-owned firms where 
members exchange use rights for benefits rights. 
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This paper aims to identify factors thought to explain differences in the 
productivity of cattle managed by farmers in southern Botswana. The study 
was prompted by claims of poor herd performance, especially amongst 
communal farmers in Botswana. The livestock sector in Botswana is 
characterised by two distinct systems of land tenure, namely; communal 
grazing - an open access resource that accounts for 86% of the cattle and 71% 
of farmers in Botswana. Private grazing is characterised by secure land rights 
and accounts for 14% of the national cattle herd and five percent of the land 
area (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991).  
 
An open access resource means that users have unrestricted use of the 
resource. Although the Ministry of Agriculture specifies maximum stocking 
rates for communal areas, these limitations are not enforced by local Land 
Boards nor are they observed by communal farmers (Carl Bro International, 
1982). In addition, water rights assigned to farmers in communal areas do not 
impose any restrictions on the volume of water used or the number of animals 
kept by stockowners (Carl Bro International, 1982). High stocking rates in the 
communal areas have been linked to high soil erosion, land degradation and a 
general decline in Botswana’s national herd from over three million in the 
early 1980’s to about 2.4 million in the 1990’s (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991). 
 
The study is important because livestock make a significant contribution to the 
livelihood of farmers in Botswana. Livestock, especially cattle, are a major 
source of meat and milk, and provide a store of wealth (Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning, 1996). As producer goods, cattle supply draught 
power, reproduce and increase the herd size. Cattle offer a hedge against 
inflation and can be readily converted into cash in times of need (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1989; Fidzani, 1993:1).  Beef exports account for most of the 
foreign exchange earned by agriculture because crop farming is severely 
constrained by erratic and unreliable rainfall (Behnke, 1987; Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1991; Panin et al, 1993; Abel, 1997; Panin & Mahabile, 1997; 
Mahabile  et al, 2002). Cattle account for about three percent of Botswana’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and for most of agriculture’s share of GDP 
(Central Statistics Office, 1995; Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning, 1996:11). Moreover, ranching is an important source of employment 
in rural Botswana where the majority of households live in communal areas 
and depend largely on cattle as a source of income (Ministry of Agriculture, 
1989). The Bank of Botswana (1999:68) attributes about 16% of rural 
employment in 1999/2000 to the agricultural sector. 




This paper begins with a discussion on herd productivity and land tenure 
systems.  Section 3 describes the technique used to collect data and postulates 
a block-recursive regression model to identify the determinants of herd 
productivity. Section 4 presents and discusses descriptive statistics and the 
estimated regression model. The paper concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. Herd  productivity  and land tenure systems  
 
There is a strong view that the productivity of the livestock sector in Botswana 
is primarily influenced by land tenure status. Economic theory suggests that 
land tenure institutions influence decisions about stocking rates (Gordon, 
1954) and investments in improvements and operating inputs (Place et al, 
1994:16-17). Gordon (1954) shows that an open access resource will be used at 
an equilibrium rate when the private cost (Pc) of exploiting the resource is 
equal to the value of the herd’s average product (VAP). At this point the 
resource is over-utilised in the economic sense (and possibly in the biological 
sense) because rents are zero. This is a departure from the profit maximising 
neoclassical model where property rights are presumed to be exclusive. In this 
case, the profit maximising equilibrium is reached when Pc is equal to the 
value of the herd’s marginal product (VMP). 
 
Stocking rates are therefore expected to be higher on open access communal 
grazing lands than on privately owned farms, ceteris paribus. Conversely, herd 
productivity is expected to be lower on open access communal grazing land. 
In KwaZulu-Natal where tenure conditions follow a pattern similar to those 
observed in southern Botswana, Lyne and Nieuwoudt (1990) report much 
lower calving rates and much higher herd mortality rates in communal areas 
than on private farms. This study takes the accepted view that herd 
productivity improves with a higher calving rate and with a lower mortality 
rate. By implication, a higher off-take rate (sales and slaughter) is also an 
objective measure of better herd productivity (Hubbard, 1986:46; Scoones, 
1992; Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1996:19; Lange et al, 
1998). Upton (1993) expresses herd productivity in his ‘herd growth model’ as 
a function of calving, mortality, off-take rates and other production traits such 
as yield of milk and draught power.  
 
There is no incentive for a communal farmer to reduce the size of his own 
herd, or to finance fixed improvements (such as boreholes to water livestock), 
on open access grazing land because the benefits would accrue largely to free-
riders. Lyne and Nieuwoudt (1990) refer to the low investment problem as the 
‘real tragedy of the commons’. Under-investment in fixed improvements leads 




(1993) also anticipate lower investment in operating inputs applied to open 
access resources owing to allocative inefficiency. This problem arises because 
there is no market for open access land owing to prohibitively high transaction 
costs. By contrast, the market for privately-owned farmland creates an 
opportunity cost for under-utilised land that encourages the owner to sell or rent 
the land out to more effective farmers (Place et al, 1994:17; Nieuwoudt, 1990).  
 
Private farmers whose land tenure is secure (in the economic sense of 
possessing fully exclusive and transferable property rights) have a stronger 
incentive to invest in fixed improveme n t s  a s  t h e y  h a v e  a  m u c h  h i g h e r  
probability of internalising the benefits of their investment (Place & Hazell, 
1993; Graham & Darroch, 2001). In Botswana, these farmers also find it easier 
to finance improvements because there is a market for privately owned land. 
Banks do not accept land as collateral for loans unless it has market value 
(Place et al, 1994:17; Kille & Lyne, 1993; Migot-Adholla et al, 1991). An active 
land market strengthens incentives to improve land because capital gains can 
be realised at any time by selling or leasing out (Pasour, 1990:200-201). 
Improvements to land and livestock tend to raise the productivity of operating 
inputs, encouraging more intensive use of supplementary feed and medications 
that prevent disease and injury.  
 
For these reasons it is postulated that herd productivity and investment 
indicators in southern Botswana will be higher on private ranches than on 
(open access) communal grazing land. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
1991 policy objective of converting open access grazing into common and 
private property (Ministry of Agriculture, 1991; Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, 1998-2003:247) and with the view that common 
property user-groups should be converted into non-user groups resembling 
company operations. In this case, members of the group surrender their use 
rights for benefit rights by exchanging livestock for equity (shares) in the 
operating entity, they hire or elect experts to manage the farm, and share 
profits in proportion to their own equity contributions (Lyne & Graham, 2001). 
To test the hypothesis, this paper develops and estimates a block-recursive 
regression model of the relationships anticipated between secure land tenure, 
agricultural credit, investment in fixed improvements to land, investment in 





The data used in this study were gathered in a sample survey of 96 livestock 




region is representative of most other cattle-farming regions in terms of terrain, 
rainfall patterns and population characteristics (Ministry of Agriculture, 
1980:4). Rainfall is typically low, averaging about 550mm per annum (Ministry 
of Agriculture, 1980:4-5). The study area comprised of two strata, one for 
communal farmers and the other for private farmers to ensure variation in 
land tenure arrangements. Households with cattle were identified and listed, 
and a simple random sample was drawn from each list. A total of 65 (black) 
communal farmers and 31 (30 black and one white) private farmers were 
interviewed using a pre-tested and structured questionnaire. Although a 
larger sample (n=120) was drawn, several of the selected farmers had left the 
study area and some were not willing to participate in the survey. Additional 
cases were not selected owing to the high cost of travelling long distances 
between farmers, especially those on private ranches. 
 
Interviews were conducted over a period of nine months with the assistance of 
four enumerators who speak both Setswana and English. Questions were 
addressed to the household head in all cases. The data were captured in a 
computerised database, and analysed using the Statistical Packages for Social 
Science  version 10 (SPSS, 1999). Estimates of mean herd size, herd 
composition, and the off-take, calving and mortality rates compared 
favourably with national and regional statistics obtained from the Ministry of 
Agriculture (2000), Central Statistics Office (1999) and the Botswana Meat 
Commission (2000).  
 
Independent t-tests were calculated to check for significant differences 
between group means computed for private and communal farmers (SPSS, 
1999:108-112; Gujurati, 1995:122-127; Koutsoyiannis, 1977:86-91). Table 1 
presents the group means and their t-values for relevant variables. Land 
tenure status was measured as a dummy variable scoring one for private 
farmers and zero for communal farmers. Zero-order correlation coefficients 
were also computed to assess the degree of linear association between pairs of 
variables relevant to the objective of the study. Variables that were strongly 
correlated were subjected to Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to reduce 
multicollinearity between explanatory variables included in the block-
recursive regression model. The model was estimated using OLS and 2SLS 
regression techniques as suggested by Place et al (1994:28-30).  
 
3.1 Principal  component analysis (PCA)  
 
The main aim of principal component analysis (PCA) is to transform the 
original set of variables, Xj’s (j = 1,2… p) into a new set of variables called 




The model for PCA is expressed as follows: 
 
Y1 = a11X1 + a12X2 +…+ a1PXP 
Y2 = a21X1 + a22X2 +…+ a2PXP 
.   .     .     . 
.   .     .     . 
YP = aP1X1 + aP2X2 +…+ aPPXP  
 
Where Yi represents the ith principal component, aiP the loading coefficients 
and XP the original variables (Koutsoyiannis, 1977: 424; Anim & Lyne, 1994). 
Principal component analysis is another example of a mathematical 
maximisation procedure where each successive component accounts for the 
maximum amount of variance remaining in the original data (Stevens, 1986:75-
376; Maddala, 1977:193) and where the principal components are orthogonal 
or uncorrelated. Principal component analysis can be used to economise on 
variables, to analyse relationships between variables or, as is in this study, to 
address the problem of multicollinearity (Koutsoyiannis, 1977:424-436). 
 
3.2  Recursive regression model  
 
The regression model was postulated as follows: 
 
(a)  c  = f (Xa, T, H) 
(b)  l   = f (X a, T, CL) 
(c)  i   = f (X a, CS, l) 
(d)  h  = f (l, i) 
 
where c represents the present value of agricultural credit (expressed in 2000 
prices) used to finance past fixed improvements and current operating 
expenses,  l measures past investment in fixed improvements to land, i is 
current investment in operating inputs per livestock unit, and h represents 
herd productivity. The vector Xa represents household and farmer 
characteristics, T is land tenure status, H the herd size, and CL and CS are 
separate measures of the present value of credit used to finance past fixed 
improvements and current operating expenses respectively. An important and 
realistic assumption underlying this model is that tenure is predetermined, i.e. 
farmers cannot change their initial property rights at will. The variables c, l, i 
and  h are endogenous. For this reason only equations (a) and (b) can be 
estimated using OLS regression. In equations (c) and (d) the endogenous 
explanatory variables must be replaced with instrumental variables to 




used to estimate equations (c) and (d) with the instrumental variables 
predicted from all of the exogenous variables in the model.  
 
Equation (a) argues that the present value of (long plus short-term) 
agricultural credit is positively influenced by secure land tenure (private 
ownership), higher liquidity and a larger herd size (wealth). Positive 
relationships are expected because farmers with greater wealth and liquidity 
are more creditworthy as they have more collateral and better repayment 
ability (Stanton, 1997). Private ownership of land not only strengthens the 
incentive to invest but also adds to the owner’s stock of wealth and collateral 
as argued in Section 2. The household and farmer characteristics include 
family size, off-farm income, marital status and the farmer’s age, education 
and gender (a dummy variable scoring one for male farmers and zero for 
females). Off-farm wage income is a relatively important and reliable source of 
liquidity for many rural households and is therefore expected to impact 
positively on access to credit owing to better debt-servicing ability. Age could 
also carry a positive sign as it measures accumulated farming experience and 
social standing. A high social standing can reduce transaction costs (Goetz, 
1992). On the other hand, age could carry a negative sign as older farmers may 
be more risk averse and less inclined to innovate than younger farmers 
(Basabrain, 1983). Education is expected to impact positively on the use of 
credit because it reduces transaction costs in formal markets and enhances 
allocative efficiency, so improving a farmer’s creditworthiness (Fidzani, 
1993:188). Gender may also influence transaction costs and creditworthiness. 
Fenwick and Lyne (1999) argue that this is true in rural KwaZulu-Natal where 
women married under customary law create greater legal uncertainty for 
lenders. In Botswana, women married in community of property (including 
women married under customary law) cannot borrow without legal consent 
from their husbands. 
 
Equation (b) postulates that investment in fixed improvements is positively 
influenced by private ownership and better access to long-term credit. Secure 
land tenure strengthens the farmer’s incentive to invest. Few improvements 
are expected where land tenure is insecure as future returns are discounted at 
a high rate owing to uncertainty (Kille & Lyne, 1993). In this case, uncertainty 
stems largely from future returns lost to other stockowners (free-riders) who 
share inclusive rights to communal grazing. Access to long-term credit 
improves a farmer’s ability to finance fixed improvements. Positive 
collinearity between secure tenure and the present value of long-term credit is 
likely in view of the arguments presented in section 2. Household and farmer 
characteristics are included largely as control variables although education is 




(Graham & Darroch, 2001) and family size is expected to carry a negative sign 
owing to a trade-off between consumption and investment. Age on the other 
hand is expected to carry a positive sign as it proxies experience and exposure 
to investment opportunities.  
 
Equation (c) states that current investment in operating inputs per livestock 
unit is positively influenced by fixed improvements to land and better access 
to short-term credit. Again, the ability to finance operating inputs is expected 
to improve with better access to short-term credit, while investment in fixed 
improvements is expected to increase the productivity of these inputs so 
strengthening the incentive to purchase them Place & Hazell, 1993). Hayes et 
al, (1997) show that investment in wells positively influenced expenditure on 
commercial inputs in the Gambia. Household and farmer characteristics are 
included largely as control variables with expected signs similar to those 
postulated for equation (b). Pudasaini (1983) found that better education 
raised agricultural productivity in Nepal. 
 
Equation (d) expresses herd productivity as a positive function of past 
investment in fixed improvements and current investment in operating inputs 
per livestock unit. Fidzani’s (1993) study of cattle off-take rates in Botswana 
supports Place et al’s (1994:28-29) argument that investment in fixed 
improvements (like boreholes and fences) and operating inputs (such as feed 
supplements and vaccines) will increase herd productivity. Investment in 
boreholes, supplementary feed and vaccines is expected to reduce mortality 
rates and improve calving and off-take rates. Positive collinearity between 
investment in fixed improvements and expenditure on operating inputs per 
livestock unit is likely following the logic of equation (c).  
 
For estimation purposes, equations (a) through (d) were specified as follows: 
 
c = B01 + B11AGE + B21GENDER + B31MARRIED + B41EDUCATION 




c = present value of agricultural credit used to finance past fixed improvements 
and current operating expenses measured in Pula4, 
AGE = age of the household head measured in years, 
GENDER = a dummy variable scoring one for male heads and zero for females,  
MARRIED = a dummy variable scoring one for married heads and zero otherwise, 
                                                             




EDUCATION = years of formal schooling completed by the household head, 
LIQUIDITY1 = monthly income remitted by household wage workers measured 
in Pula, 
FAMILY = household size, 
HERD = herd size, and  
TENURE = a dummy variable scoring one if land is privately owned and zero 
if it is an open access communal resource. 
 
LN (l) = B02 + B12AGE + B22GENDER + B32MARRIED + B42EDUCATION 




LN (l) = natural log of one plus the present value of investment in boreholes 
measured in Pula, and 
CL = present value of long-term credit used to finance boreholes, the most 
frequently observed improvement and the only one for which reliable data 
could be gathered. 
 
LN (i) = B03 + B13AGE + B23GENDER + B33MARRIED + B43EDUCATION 




LN (i) = natural log of one plus current expenditure on operating inputs per 
livestock unit measured in Pula, and 
CS = value of seasonal credit used to finance current operating inputs. 
Positive collinearity anticipated between CS and LIQUIDITY1 was removed by 
summing the two variables (i.e. CS + LIQUIDITY1) to create an index called 
LIQUIDITY2  
 




h = herd productivity measured as the calving rate. 
 
Off-take and mortality rates were not used as measures of productivity because 
animals in poor condition are sold or slaughtered for own consumption. This 
tends to understate mortality rates and to overstate off-take rates (Fidzani, 




and expenditure on operating inputs per livestock unit was addressed by 
summing these variables (LN(l+i)). 
 
4. Empirical  results   
 
4.1 Farmer  characteristics 
 
Table 1 summarises key attributes of sample farmers and their households. No 
significant differences were detected between the mean age, gender, family 
size or residential status (where heads residing on their farms scored a one, 
and zero otherwise) of private and communal livestock farmers. Racial 
differences were not considered because all but one of the respondents were 
black. Most herds are managed by older, married men who reside on-farm 
with their (large) rural families, and who regard livestock farming as their 
main occupation. These findings are consistent with results from an earlier 
study in Botswana by Panin (1999). 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for demographic characteristics of 96 stockowners 









Average age   Years  55  52  1.37 
Gender  % male  94  95   0.40 
Average size of household  # 6  7  1.12 
Married  % 97 63  4.62** 
Residential status  % on-farm  88  92   0.61 
Average years of schooling  Years 10  2 8.32** 
Average years of farming  Years 31  20 4.85** 














Mean monthly income remitted by wage workers  Pula 2308  715  2.74** 














Gross annual livestock income   Pula 98363  3049  1.49 
Note:  ** shows statistical significance at the one percent level of probability. 
 
Despite these similarities, private and communal farmers in the sample 
differed on some important household variables. Private farmers appear to 




education and farming experience. In addition, private farmers have much 
larger cash inflows from wage remittances and livestock sales, and are 
therefore more liquid than communal farmers.  
 
4.2  Livestock ownership and herd productivity indicators 
 
Sample means and proportions for indicators of herd productivity and 
investments made by private and communal farmers are presented in Table 2. 
Average herd size is substantially larger on private farms, as is expenditure on 
operating inputs per livestock unit (LU) and the incidence of boreholes. Both 
the calving and off-take (i.e. sales plus slaughter) rates are much higher on 
private farms than amongst communal farmers. This is consistent with 
findings reported by Behnke (1987); Scoones (1992) and the Central Statistics 
Office (1995). 
 
Table  2:  Mean productivity and investment indicators for open access and 









Number of breeding cows and heifers  #  273  26  4.05*** 
Number of calves  #  141  8  3.36** 
Number of bulls  #  5  1  3.43* 
Aggregate herd size  LU1 262 30 2.59* 
Calving rate  %  66  35  7.75** 
Off-take rate  %  20  12  2.46*  
Mortality rate  %  2  5  2.15* 
De-worm %  87  37  5.64** 
De-horn %  86  84  3.00** 
Practice supplementary feeding  %  80  63  2.91** 
Vaccinate %  87  38  5.74** 
Treat cattle against ticks  %  71  44  3.21** 
Financed own borehole  %  77  7  8.20** 
Annual operating inputs per LU  Pula/LU  620  51  1.67* 
Notes:  1 LU = Livestock Unit defined as a mature animal with a live weight of 500 kg. 
  *and ** show statistical significance at the five and one percent level of probability respectively. 
 
On the other hand, the mortality rate is lower on private farms where the 
incidence of de-worming, dehorning, supplementary feeding, vaccination and 
dipping against tick-borne d i s e a s e s  i s  m u c h  h i g h e r  ( T a b l e  2 ) .  C o m m u n a l  
farmers tend to have fewer calves and bulls per cow than do private farmers. 
These findings are consistent with the arguments in Section 2 that decisions 




land and herds) are adversely affected by insecure property rights to open 
access grazing. Unable to internalise benefits, maximise profits, or raise loan 
finance, communal farmers tend to keep cattle as a store of wealth rather than 
as a commercial enterprise (Jarvis, 1980).  
 
4.3  The block recursive regression results  
 
The regression results presented in Table 3 show that all four of the equations 
estimated for the recursive model are statistically significant. The 
corresponding R2 values range from 40 to 58% and compare favourably with 
other similar cross-section studies Place & Hazell, 1993; Hayes et al, 1997; 
Matangul et al, 2001). In equation 1 the regression coefficient estimated for the 
variable GENDER is positive and has a t-value larger than unity suggesting 
that the present value of short and long-term credit used by respondents is 
higher for farmers who are male. The variables HERD and TENURE are not 
independent (r = 0.376) and it was not possible to estimate their separate 
contributions to the level of agricultural credit. Principal Components 
Analysis (PCA) was therefore used to construct an index from these two 
variables. The first principal component was estimated as: 
 
PC1 = 0.829(standardised HERD) + 0.829(standardised TENURE) 
 
with an eigen value of 1.4. This index accounted for 69% of the variation in 
HERD and TENURE and was included in Equation 1 as a positive measure of 
these variables. The regression coefficient estimated for this index is positive, 
highly significant and carries the largest beta value. TENURE therefore 
appears to be the underlying determinant of agricultural credit used by 
respondents because current herd size is m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  
tenure status than vice versa. Respondents with private farms and larger herds 
are both willing and able to access more agricultural credit - as argued in 
Sections 2 and 3.2. Contrary to expectations, LIQUIDITY1 is not statistically 
significant when proxied by wage income. To some extent this might reflect 
Botswana’s Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) and the generous terms of 
government lending agencies (such as the National Development Bank (NDB)) 
and its grant schemes. The Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP) 
and Services to Livestock Owners in Communal Areas (SLOCA) provided 
financial support to many producers, including farmers who may not have 
been considered creditworthy by commercial banks (Bank of Botswana, 
2000:60-61). The NDB disbursed P98 million in agricultural loans, mostly to 











Table 3:  Estimates of the block recursive regression model 
Equation  1 (OLS)  2 (OLS)  3 (2SLS)  4 (2SLS) 
Dependent variables  Agricultural credit (c)  Fixed improvements (LN (l))  Operating inputs (LN (i)) Herd  productivity  (h) 
Predictors  Coef Beta  t-value  Coef Beta  t-value  Coef Beta  t-value  Coef Beta  t-value 
Intercept 28165    0.40  4.81    1.92* 4.50    5.29***  16.89    2.85*** 
Endogenous variables                      
LN (l)            0.037  0.12    0.82       
LN (l+I)                  3.91  0.66  5.92*** 
Exogenous variables                     
AGE 674  0.01    0.05  0.003  0.00  0.01  -0.390  -0.27  -2.02**       
GENDER  65727  0.12  1.10  0.12 0.01 0.06  -0.930  -0.15  -1.25       
MARRIED  35986  0.10    0.78  1.65 0.11 1.02  -0.790  -0.18  -1.29       
FAMILY 3124  0.05    0.43  -0.27  -0.12  -1.11  0.000  0.001  0.008       
EDUCATION 5123  0.12    0.79  0.16  0.10 0.75  0.050   0.09  0.62       
LIQUIDITY1 -1.23  -0.02    -0.02  0.00047  0.21  2.03**             
TENURE and HERD indexa  71233  0.51  3.14***                
CL and TENURE indexa       3.14  0.52  3.82***             
LIQUIDITY2            0.000060  0.40  2.91***       
R2 0.40  0.58  0.40  0.40 
Adj R2  0.32 0.52  0.31  0.39 
F 5.21***  10.01***  4.42***  35.02*** 
Notes:  a  First Principal Component. 
***  Significant at one percent level of probability. 
**  Significant at five percent level of probability. 
 




In equation 2 the regression coefficient estimated for LIQUIDITY1 is positive 
and statistically significant. Investment in fixed improvements is higher 
amongst respondents who get more off-farm wage income. Credit used to 
finance fixed improvements (CL) is positively correlated with TENURE (r = 
0.587) and it was not possible to estimate the separate contributions of these 
variables to investment in fixed improvements. Again, Principal Component 
Analysis was used to construct an index of the correlated variables. The first 
principal component was estimated as; 
PC1 = 0.765(standardised CL) + 0.765(standardised TENURE) 
with an eigen value of 1.2. This index accounted for 59% of the variation in CL 
and TENURE and was included in Equation 2 as a positive measure of these 
variables. The regression coefficient estimated for this index is positive, highly 
significant and carries the largest beta value. Since TENURE is predetermined 
and not influenced by the amount of credit used to finance fixed 
improvements, it could again be viewed as the underlying determinant of 
such investment followed by CL, and the independent determinants 
LIQUIDITY1, FAMILY and MARRIED - all of which have absolute t-values 
greater than unity. FAMILY has a negative coefficient suggesting that there is 
a trade-off between consumption and investment. Respondents with private 
farms use more long-term credit to finance fixed improvements, and invest 
more in these improvements than do communal farmers who rely on open 
access grazing land - especially if they get more off-farm wage income, are 
married and have smaller families.  
 
In equation 3 the regression coefficient estimated for LIQUIDITY2 is positive 
and statistically significant. This is consistent with the arguments made in 
section 3.2. Contrary to some arguments, the results indicate that older, 
married, male respondents are less inclined to invest in operating inputs. 
According to its beta value, liquidity (from short-term credit and off-farm 
wage income) is the most important, and the only positive, direct determinant 
of expenditure on operating inputs per livestock unit.  
 
In equation 4 the regression coefficient estimated for the present value of 
investment in fixed improvement plus current expenditure on operating 
inputs per livestock unit is positive and highly significant. This result is 
consistent with the arguments made in sections 2 and 3.2. Secure land tenure 
has an indirect effect on herd productivity through its direct impact on 
agricultural credit and investment in fixed improvements. The Ministry of 
Agriculture (1991) also found that farmers who owned boreholes and who 
purchased supplementary feed had higher calving rates than those who did not.  




In equation 4 the regression coefficient estimated for the present value of 
investment in fixed improvement plus current expenditure on operating 
inputs per livestock unit is positive and highly significant. This result is 
consistent with the arguments made in sections 2 and 3.2. Secure land tenure 
has an indirect effect on herd productivity through its direct impact on 
agricultural credit and investment in fixed improvements. The Ministry of 
Agriculture (1991) also found that farmers who owned boreholes and who 
purchased supplementary feed had higher calving rates than those who did not.  
 
5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Results of the regression analysis suggest that secure land tenure is a 
fundamental determinant of agricultural credit use. Respondents with private 
farms and larger herds use more agricultural credit than those who rely on 
open access communal grazing to raise cattle. Secure tenure is also a fundamental 
determinant of investment in fixed improvements. Respondents with private 
farms and higher levels of liquidity from long-term credit and off-farm wage 
remittances tend to invest more in fixed improvements. Liquidity from short-
term credit and wage remittances is the most important direct determinant of 
expenditure on operating inputs. Herd productivity, in turn, increases with 
greater investment in operating inputs and fixed improvements, and is 
therefore positively (but indirectly) influenced by secure land tenure. 
 
It can be inferred that government should (a) uphold private property rights to 
land where they already exist; (b) privatise open access grazing to individual 
owner-operators where this is politically, socially and economically feasible; 
and (c) where privatisation to individuals is not feasible, government should 
encourage users to convert the grazing into common property by subsidising 
the (transaction) costs of defining user groups and the boundaries of their 
resources, and of negotiating and enforcing rules limiting individual use of 
common property. This first-step in a gradual shift towards private property 
might be followed by a conversion of user-groups into non-user groups 
organised along the lines of investor-owned firms where members exchange 
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